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Racially Neutral in Form,
Racially Discriminatory in Fact:
The Implications for Voting Rights
of Giving Disproportionate Racial
Impact the Constitutional
Importance It Deserves
by Gary J. Simson*
In two decisions in the mid-1970s, Washington v. Davis1 and Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,2 the
U.S. Supreme Court made clear that proving that a law racially neutral
on its face disproportionately disadvantages racial minorities does not
establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause3 or even create a
presumption that such a violation has occurred. Disproportionate racial
impact “is not irrelevant,” the Court explained, but “it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.”4 The key, according to the Court, lies in proving that the
*Macon Chair in Law and Former Dean, Mercer University School of Law; Professor
Emeritus of Law, Cornell Law School. Yale College (B.A. 1971); Yale Law School (J.D.
1974). I am grateful to the other principal speakers at the Election Law Symposium event
for their questions and comments about my presentation and for the many insights about
election law they shared in their presentations. Special thanks to: my Mercer Law
colleague, Dave Oedel, for his thoughtful remarks at the Symposium event as the
commentator on my presentation; Maia Middleton, the Law Review’s Symposium editor,
for her stellar work on the Symposium event and publication; and Mercer philosophy
professor Rosalind Simson for her invaluable contributions as a sounding board
throughout the writing process.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
3. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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law was the product of a racially discriminatory purpose. 5 My focus in
this Article will be the fundamental inadequacy of that approach and
the reprieve that it wrongly gives to voter identification laws, purges of
voters from registration rolls, and other legal barriers to voting that,
though framed in terms that make no mention of race,
disproportionately disadvantage racial minorities.
Legal barriers to voting that disproportionately disadvantage racial
minorities are hardly a modern phenomenon. Most obviously, it took a
Civil War and the ratification in 1870 of the Fifteenth Amendment 6 to
put an end to state laws treating African Americans’ race as a
disqualification for voting,7 and it was not until Congress’s enactment of
the Voting Rights Act of 19658 that states had to stop using literacy
tests as a pretext to keep many blacks from the polls. 9
However, as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights documented in
detail in a 2018 report,10 recent years have seen an increase in the
variety and number of legal impediments to voting that
disproportionately disadvantage racial minorities. 11 Voter identification
laws, for example, “were not prominent until the late 20 th century,”12
but by 2000, they existed in fourteen states in one or another form, and
since 2000, that number has been “on the rise.” 13 Also according to the
report, the justifications commonly offered in defense of legal barriers to
voting that disproportionately disadvantage racial minorities tend to be
exceptionally weak.14 Under the circumstances, one hardly needs to be a
cynic to question the reality of a claimed justification and to believe
5. Id. at 238-42.
6. “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
7. See Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws (last visited Mar. 1,
2020).
8. As amended, the Act is codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–14 (2020).
9. See Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 7.
10. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AN ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
ACCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/Minority_
Voting_Access_2018.pdf.
11. The chapter that is by far the longest in the report, “Recent Changes in Voting
Laws and Procedures That Impact Minority Voters,” see id. at 83–198, identifies the
principal changes in voting laws and procedures in recent years and analyzes in detail the
impact of those innovations on racial minorities.
12. Id. at 85.
13. Id. at 86.
14. See, e.g., id. at 282 (“Study after study, including from the Republican National
Lawyers Association, confirm that voter fraud is extremely rare in the United States.”).
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instead that racial bias played a crucial role. After unanimously finding
that “[r]acial discrimination in voting has proven to be a particularly
pernicious and enduring American problem,” 15 the Commission
underlined the wide range of state-created impediments that in its view
have perpetuated that problem. “In states across the country,” the
Commission maintained, measures that “wrongly prevent some citizens
from voting have been enacted and have a disparate impact on voters of
color and poor citizens, including but not limited to: voter ID laws, voter
roll purges, proof of citizenship measures, challenges to voter eligibility,
and polling place moves or closings.”16
In Part I of the Article, I lay out more fully the lessons of Davis and
Arlington Heights for challenges under the Equal Protection Clause to
facially race-neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantage racial
minorities. In Part II, I argue that, from the start, the Davis–Arlington
Heights approach posed relatively little threat of invalidation to laws
disproportionately disadvantaging racial minorities. Drawing on legal
barriers to voting for illustrations, I maintain that, due to a
combination of factors, the only laws truly threatened by the approach
are ones at the extreme—ones patently and unmistakably the product
of bias against racial minorities. In Part III, I argue that the Davis–
Arlington Heights approach to disproportionate racial impact wrongly
ignores basic assumptions about the lawmaking process that help
explain the Court’s longtime treatment as “suspect” of laws explicitly
disadvantaging racial minorities. In Part IV, I propose an alternative
approach that gives disproportionate racial impact the independent
importance that I believe it deserves under the Equal Protection
Clause. In Part V, I briefly discuss the implications of adopting my
proposed approach, with special attention to the implications for
prevalent legal impediments to voting. I conclude in Part VI by
highlighting the practical importance of my proposal even if today’s
Supreme Court may not appear to be an ideal audience to embrace it.
I. THE LESSONS OF DAVIS AND ARLINGTON HEIGHTS
To understand the lessons of Davis and Arlington Heights, it is
helpful to begin with a decision by the Court several years earlier—
Palmer v. Thompson17 in 1971. Faced with a judgment declaring that it
15. Id. at 277. See also Letter of Transmittal from Catherine E. Lhamon, Chair, U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights to President Donald J. Trump et al. (Sept. 12, 2018), in id. at
unnumbered prefatory page (“The Commission voted unanimously to reach key
findings . . . .”).
16. Id. at 282.
17. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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was violating the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining racially
segregated public swimming pools, the city of Jackson, Mississippi
closed all the pools. Various African-American residents then
challenged the closings in federal court as violating the Equal
Protection Clause. After the federal district and appellate courts
rejected the challenge, the Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote affirmed.
Whether in the majority or in dissent, the Justices seemed agreed
that the case turned on the city’s purpose in closing the pools. They
disagreed sharply, however, as to what the city’s purpose should be
understood to be. From the perspective of Justice White, who authored
the principal dissent,18 the city’s claim that it had closed the pools out of
concern that, if integrated, the pools could not be operated safely and
economically was not even “colorable.” 19 The “only evidence in this
record” to support the existence of any such purpose, Justice White
maintained, “is the conclusions of the officials themselves, unsupported
by even a scintilla of added proof.”20 In his view, the city’s purpose in
closing the pools was “solely” to circumvent the desegregation order,21
and the city’s acting pursuant to that purpose “express[ed] its official
view that Negroes are so inferior that they are unfit to share with
whites this particular type of public facility.” 22 The impact of the
closings, according to Justice White, therefore fell equally on blacks and
whites only in the most superficial sense. “[T]he reality” was a
markedly disproportionate negative impact on the minority. 23 “Whites
feel nothing but disappointment and perhaps anger at the loss of the
facilities,” Justice White explained. “Negroes feel that and more. They
are stigmatized by official implementation of a policy that the
Fourteenth Amendment condemns as illegal.” 24
Writing for the majority, Justice Black took a very different view of
the city’s purpose—a view that led him to conclude that there was no
equal protection problem at all. From Justice Black’s perspective, it was
a very simple case: The city had argued that it closed the pools because
18. Justice White’s detailed and often impassioned dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall and spanned about thirty pages in the United States Reports.
Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion about one-third that length, and Justice
Marshall wrote a very brief opinion joined by Justices Brennan and White that largely
referenced the other two dissenting opinions.
19. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 266 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
20. Id. at 260.
21. Id. at 266.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 268.
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“they could not be operated safely and economically on an integrated
basis”;25 there was “substantial evidence in the record”26 to lend support
to that description of the city’s purpose; and under that understanding
of the city’s purpose, there was no reason to think that the pool closings
impacted blacks any differently than whites, and the challengers’ equal
protection claim necessarily failed. As Justice Black saw it, the dissent’s
charge that the city’s stated purpose was pretextual and that the city
instead had acted on the basis of an invidious purpose of avoiding the
mixing of the races was simply out of bounds. “[N]o case in this Court,”
Justice Black maintained, “has held that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted
for it,”27 and he made clear that he was not about to start striking down
laws on that basis in Palmer.
To illuminate the “pitfalls”28 of courts’ inquiring into purposes other
than those acknowledged by the lawmaker, Justice Black first cited a
page in one of Chief Justice Marshall’s legendary opinions. The page
alluded to the sensitivity of courts’ questioning the motives of “members
of the supreme sovereign power of a State” and spoke of the need for a
“principle by which judicial interference would be regulated” if courts
were to embark on invalidating laws passed with improper motive. 29
Justice Black then ticked off a series of practical objections: “it is
extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection
of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment”; “[i]t is
difficult or impossible for any court to determine the ‘sole’ or ‘dominant’
motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators”; and “there is an
element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law [based on]
the bad motives of its supporters” because “it would presumably be
valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it
for different reasons.”30
Several years later, when the Court handed down its decision in
Washington v. Davis, the majority opinion was authored by Justice
White, who had objected so strenuously in Palmer to the Court’s refusal
there to take seriously any purpose that the lawmaker was unwilling to
claim as its own. Perhaps because Justice Black was no longer on the
Court to object, Justice White was content to rely on a rather oblique
reference to Palmer in a footnote to signal that the Palmer approach to
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 225 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224–25.
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motive was officially dead,31 but there could be no doubt that his
opinion had laid it to rest. Davis was an equal protection challenge32 to
a District of Columbia police department’s use of a written qualifying
exam that had the effect of screening out a much higher proportion of
black applicants for the police force than white applicants. Justice
White made clear that a law having a disproportionate racial impact
may be successfully challenged under the Equal Protection Clause if the
challenger can prove that the impact can “ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose.”33 However, having opened the door
somewhat to motive-based challenges, Justice White went on to explain
why such a challenge to the police department’s qualifying exam did not
present a close case. In his view, the district court’s finding that a
higher percentage of black, than white, applicants failed the test paled
in significance alongside the department’s “affirmative efforts . . . to
recruit black officers”34 and other factors deemed important by the
district court.35
While denying relief on the ground that the challengers had failed to
prove that the disproportionate racial impact was traceable to a racially
discriminatory purpose, Justice White also took care to lay to rest any
thought that the disproportionate racial impact might have any
constitutional importance other than as possible evidence of such a
purpose. In the case at hand, the federal appellate court below had
ruled for the challengers and, in doing so, had made clear that it
understood disproportionate racial impact as having such independent

31. Davis, 426 U.S. at 244 n.11 (“To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally
applicable proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication,
our prior cases—as indicated in the text—are to the contrary. . . .”).
32. Strictly speaking, Davis did not implicate the Equal Protection Clause because
the Court has long treated that clause as applicable to state and local government, but not
the federal government, and because the District of Columbia is a federal, rather than
state or local, entity. However, the challenge in Davis could be predicated on equal
protection principles because the Court has also long treated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as having an equal protection component. See, e.g., Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
33. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
34. Id. at 246.
35. See id. (“changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in
general, and the relationship of the test to the training program”). Justice White noted
earlier in the opinion the district court’s observation that the test was devised by the U.S.
Civil Service Commission, rather than the D.C. police department, and was used
throughout the federal civil service system. Id. at 234–35. Although he did not cite the
test’s origins outside the department and wide use as especially casting doubt on the
validity of the motive-based challenge to the department’s use of the test, Justice Stevens
did so in his concurring opinion. Id. at 254–55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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importance.36 The appellate court had expressly indicated that it was
proceeding on the assumption that it should apply in the constitutional
realm the approach to disproportionate racial impact that the Court in
1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.37 had applied in the statutory realm. 38
In Griggs the Court had interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act—the Act’s employment discrimination provisions—as making
presumptively invalid any “tests or criteria for employment or
promotion”39 that disproportionately burden racial minorities. Unless
the employer could show that the test or criterion “bear[s] a
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which it was used,”40 the test or criterion could not lawfully be used.
“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent,” the Court in Griggs
maintained, “does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”41
In no uncertain terms, however, the Court in Davis rejected the
notion that the Griggs approach to disproportionate racial impact
applied to constitutional challenges. As the Court explained, “Because
the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the legal standards applicable
to Title VII cases in resolving the constitutional issue before it, we
reverse its judgment in respondents’ favor.”42 In fact, in the Court’s

36. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Although the D.C. Circuit did not claim in this case that Palmer v. Thompson implicitly
established that disproportionate racial impact had independent constitutional
importance, a number of courts did so prior to Washington v. Davis. See Michael Klarman,
An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 296–97 (1991)
(explaining the courts’ thinking in interpreting Palmer that way).
37. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
38. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d at 957 n.2.
39. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 432.
42. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238. Professor Fiss has strongly criticized the Court’s
insistence in Davis that Griggs had no bearing on the constitutional issue at hand:
[The Supreme Court in 1969] announced a doctrine founded on an
understanding of the interconnection between practices that disadvantaged
Blacks. That case—United States v. Gaston County—condemned the practice of
denying Blacks the right to vote for failing a literacy test when they had been
systematically denied equal educational opportunities as children . . . . [T]he
Justices were driven by an idea—let’s call it the theory of cumulative
responsibility—which condemns any institution, regardless of its own past
actions, from engaging in a practice that aggravates, perpetuates, or merely
carries over a disadvantage Blacks had received at the hands of some other
institution acting at some other time and in some other domain.
....
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view, the appellate court’s application of Title VII standards to resolve
the constitutional issue was such “ ‘plain error’ ”43 that the Court felt
obliged to set straight the matter of the applicable standards even
though the petition for certiorari did not ask the Court to address it.
According to the Court, the court below lost sight of “the constitutional
rule”44 that runs through the Court’s equal protection decisions—“the
basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose.”45
Although the plaintiffs in Davis came away empty-handed, Davis
was not all bad news for future challengers of disproportionate racial
impacts. The Court’s departure in Davis from the Palmer v. Thompson
approach to motive-based challenges did create an opportunity that
some challengers might use to good advantage. Furthermore, a year
later, the Court in Arlington Heights seemed intent on cementing the
importance of that opportunity. Unlike Justice White, who in Davis had

. . . [T]he Supreme Court [in 1971 in Griggs] applied the theory of
cumulative responsibility in the employment context and barred private
employers from using tests or other educational requirements that would,
because of the inferior quality of the schooling that Blacks had received, result
in disparate impact on them . . . .
....
The theory of cumulative responsibility appreciates the interconnected
character of social life and the fact that people carry disadvantages they
receive in one domain, say education, to others, such as employment. It is
predicated on the sad truth that inequality begets inequality. The Griggs
principle is founded on this theory . . . .
Th[e] obligation [recognized by the Griggs principle] is not imposed because
we assume or even believe that the firm in question has played a role in
creating the racial caste system that now subjugates Blacks. Rather, it arises
from a proper understanding of the responsibility that every member of the
community, even one born yesterday, now has to eradicate the stratified social
structure that has marred American society since its inception . . . .
....
In its 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court . . . drew a
bold distinction between constitution and statute and downgraded the Griggs
principle to a statutory rule. Such a move has always struck me as a strained
reading of Griggs. Although as a purely technical matter, Griggs had been
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Chief Justice’s
opinion [for the Court] in that case had a constitutional quality. The crucial
precedent upon which Chief Justice Burger relied, namely, Gaston County, was
based on the Constitution . . . .
Owen Fiss, The Accumulation of Disadvantages, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1945, 1946–47, 1949–
51 (2018).
43. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238 (quoting Rule 40(1)(d)(2) of the Revised Supreme Court
Rules).
44. Id. at 239.
45. Id. at 240.

[6] RACIALLY NEUTRAL IN FORM - BP (EDITS INCORPORATED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

RACIALLY NEUTRAL IN FORM

4/13/2020 10:51 AM

819

made no real effort to refute Justice Black’s stated reasons in Palmer
for refusing to delve into motive, Justice Powell, writing for the Court in
Arlington Heights, took on the task in earnest.
Drawing on a leading scholarly article on unconstitutional motive
written in direct response to Palmer,46 Justice Powell countered each of
Justice Black’s reasons.47 He acknowledged that lawmakers are
“properly
concerned
with
balancing
numerous
competing
considerations” and that, as a result, judicial inquiries into the “merits”
of lawmakers’ decisions are sensitive, and judges must be deferential in
conducting any such inquiries.48 He maintained, however, that “proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the
decision” fundamentally changes the picture, and “judicial deference is
no longer justified.”49
Similarly, while conceding that determining whether a lawmaker
was moved by an unconstitutional motive can frequently be difficult,
Justice Powell rejected the notion that it is somehow beyond a court’s
capacity to make such a determination. He not only affirmed, as a
general proposition, the feasibility of making sensible determinations
by careful judicial inquiry into “such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available.”50 Even more importantly, he went
further and offered a “summary [that] identifies, without purporting to
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether
racially discriminatory intent existed.”51 According to that summary,
the “subjects of proper inquiry” include: whether the law “ ‘bears more

46. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.12, 268 n.18 (citing Paul Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP.
CT. REV. 95). At the time of writing the article, Professor Brest was very early in an
illustrious academic career that would span many years at Stanford Law School and
include numerous influential pieces of scholarship on constitutional law. See Paul Brest,
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL DIRECTORY, https://law.stanford.edu/directory/paul-brest/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2020).
47. Perhaps simply out of deference to the memory of a widely admired Justice who
had died only several years earlier, Justice Powell was less explicit than he might have
been in pointing to Justice Black’s opinion in Palmer as the source of the reasons that
Powell was refuting. Powell did not mention Palmer by name in the text of his opinion.
However, his references in footnotes to Palmer and to Professor Brest’s article critiquing
Palmer made clear that Black’s reasons in Palmer for rejecting motive inquiries were very
much at the forefront of Powell’s mind when he authored the Court’s opinion in Arlington
Heights. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 nn.10 & 11, 266 n.12, 268 n.18.
48. Id. at 265.
49. Id. at 265–66.
50. Id. at 266.
51. Id. at 268.
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heavily on one race than another’ ”;52 the “historical background of the
decision”; the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision”; “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence”;
“[s]ubstantive departures” from the weight usually assigned particular
factors; “contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body, minutes of its meetings, or reports”; and in “extraordinary
instances,” trial testimony about purpose by lawmakers subpoenaed
and “called to the stand.”53
Justice Powell did not argue that Justice Black was wrong in
asserting that determining a multi-member body’s single or principal
purpose in enacting a law can be an insuperable task. Instead, he
maintained that the determination was simply beside the point. The
relevant question according to Powell is not whether an
unconstitutional purpose was the lawmaker’s sole or primary purpose
in adopting the law. Instead, it is whether the unconstitutional purpose
was a “motivating factor” in the lawmaker’s decision to adopt the law. 54
Lastly, although Justice Powell did not expressly address Justice
Black’s futility objection, he did discount its significance indirectly. The
essence of Black’s objection was that striking down a law because it was
found to be adopted for an unconstitutional purpose would be a waste of
everyone’s time because the legislature could simply reenact the law
and state for general consumption that it was doing so for one or more
constitutionally permissible purposes. In an important footnote at the
end of the opinion, Justice Powell clarified the parties’ burdens of proof
in a case in which the challenger seeks to invalidate a law based on an
unconstitutional purpose:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a
racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required
invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would, however,
have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered. . . .55

Although Justice Powell’s footnote was not addressed to the
reenactment scenario that was the focus of Black’s futility objection,
Powell’s burden-shifting prescription in the footnote can fairly be

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 266 (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
Id. at 266–68.
Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 270 n.21.
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understood as supplying the answer that he would have given to that
objection.56
The challenged governmental action in Arlington Heights was a
village’s refusal to rezone a parcel of land to allow the construction of
low- and moderate-income housing that would be expected to increase
significantly the percentage of racial minorities in the village. In light of
both Justice Powell’s strong affirmation of the Court’s willingness to
entertain motive-based challenges and his detailed description of
“subjects of proper inquiry,” one might have anticipated that he would
be slow to reject the challenge at hand and that if he were to reject it,
he would feel obliged to provide a detailed explanation. Instead, he
appeared to treat the challenge as presenting not at all a close question
and rejected the challenge in short order. He conceded that the “impact
of the Village’s decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial
minorities,”57 but he found nothing in the other “subjects of proper
inquiry” he had articulated to lend support to the notion that the
disproportionate racial impact may have been rooted in a
discriminatory purpose. “Respondents simply failed,” he stated in
conclusion, “to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision.” 58
Although Davis and Arlington Heights put in place what continues to
be the Court’s basic approach under the Equal Protection Clause to
disproportionate racial impact, a third Supreme Court decision from the
1970s, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,59 offered
important clarification.60 Feeney involved an equal protection challenge

56. According to Justice Powell, proof that a racially discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the adoption of a law logically calls for shifting to the government the
burden of proving that the law would have been adopted even if that purpose had not
been considered. In keeping with that logic, if a law is struck down based on proof that it
would not have been adopted but for a racially discriminatory purpose, and if the law is
subsequently reenacted, it easily follows that the government should bear the burden of
proving that the reenactment did not depend on consideration of that racially
discriminatory purpose.
57. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269.
58. Id. at 270.
59. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Feeney actually came up to the Supreme Court twice, both
times on appeals of judgments from a three-judge district court striking down the law
under review. The first time that Feeney came before the Court, the Court had already
decided Davis but not Arlington Heights. The Court disposed of the appeal by remanding
for reconsideration in light of Davis, which the Court had decided after the district court’s
decision in Feeney. The second time that Feeney came before the Court, the Court had
already decided both Davis and Arlington Heights.
60. For a collection of articles by leading constitutional scholars that was sparked by
the Court’s opinions in Davis and Arlington Heights and preceded the Court’s decision in
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to a law disproportionately disadvantaging women, not racial
minorities, but the Court made very clear that it regarded Davis and
Arlington Heights as the controlling precedents and was expounding
upon their meaning.61
The law challenged in Feeney—a Massachusetts law giving veterans
who pass a civil service examination what the Court called a “well nigh
absolute advantage”62 in competing for civil service jobs—starkly
presented the question of the significance, for purposes of a
motive-based equal protection challenge, of two factors: the magnitude
of the disproportionality in impact on the group represented by the
challengers; and the foreseeability of that impact. Whether gauged at
the time the statute was first enacted (1896), at one of the times the
Feeney, see Colloquium, Legislative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 925 (1978).
61. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272–73. Professor Haney-Lopez has pointed to Feeney as far
more than simply an exposition of Davis and Arlington Heights. Rather, it was a
“transitional case marking an abrupt rupture in intent doctrine.” Ian Haney-Lopez,
Intentional Blindness, 87 NYU L. REV. 1779, 1825 (2012). In his view, a proper
understanding of Feeney requires “plac[ing]” it into the “colorblindness timeline” that
begins with Justice Powell’s well-known lead opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)—an opinion in which Justice Powell announced
the judgment of the Court but wrote only for himself. Haney-Lopez, supra, 87 NYU L.
REV. at 1828. That opinion, according to Professor Haney-Lopez, “established the
fundamentals of modern colorblind analysis—not automatic invalidity but its close cousin,
the mechanical application of the highest level of constitutional hostility to all express
uses of race.” Id. at 1826. As he further explained:
Just a year after Bakke, in Feeney five Justices began to rework intent
doctrine. Strikingly, they did so in direct reliance upon Powell’s colorblind
reasoning . . . . Extending Powell’s analysis in Bakke, Feeney split equal
protection into the separate domains now taken for granted, one governing
affirmative action and the other discrimination against non-Whites. In turn,
this schism contributed directly to the rise of the malicious intent rule
requiring the nearly impossible proof of malice.
....
. . . [O]nly after having announced a mechanical distrust of any use of race
did Stewart [in his opinion for the Court in Feeney] address intent doctrine.
When he did so, he recast intent doctrine as the inverse of Powell’s automatic
hostility to express uses of race. Now, absent a reference to race, even
government action that disproportionately harmed non-Whites would be
presumptively constitutional . . . .
....
. . . Feeney defined “intent” as acting not just in full awareness of impending
harm but out of a desire to cause such harm . . . .
How did the Court come to this stringent definition of intent? At the most
fundamental level, it seems likely that the Justices in the majority remade
intent in a manner that reflected their basic intuition that discrimination
simply had not occurred . . . .
Id. at 1828, 1831, 1833.
62. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 264.
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statute was amended to expand its coverage to include veterans of later
wars (1919, 1943, 1949, 1954, 1968), 63 or at the time the challengers in
Feeney brought suit (1974),64 the law, in the Court’s words, “operate[d]
overwhelmingly to the advantage of males,” 65 and it would “be
disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for
women . . . were not foreseeable.”66 At the time of suit, primarily as a
result of federal laws that “restricted the number of women who could
enlist” and “the simple fact that women have never been subjected to a
military draft,”67 only 1.8% of veterans in Massachusetts were women.68
In short, Feeney was the epitome of a case in which both the
disproportionality in impact on the disadvantaged group and the
foreseeability of that impact were very high. As a result, in and of itself,
the Feeney Court’s rejection of the motive-based challenge to the law
under review spoke volumes about the limited significance that the
Court assigned to those factors in the discriminatory purpose inquiry
authorized by Davis and Arlington Heights.
The Court’s express reasoning in Feeney also offered important
insight into the nature of that inquiry. Perhaps out of some recognition
that the two factors noted above might appear to many to militate
strongly for the opposite result, the Court addressed more directly than
it had in Davis and Arlington Heights a question that lies at the heart
of that inquiry: What counts as a “discriminatory purpose”? The Court
explained that the term “implies more than intent as volition or intent
as awareness of consequences.”69 Instead, it “implies that the
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 70 A
discriminatory purpose only exists if “the adverse effects were
desired.”71 In the case at hand, the Court found that there was no such

63. The history of the Massachusetts statute is set forth in id. at 266–67.
64. See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 493 (D. Mass. 1976) (3-judge
court), vacated & remanded, 434 U.S. 884 (1976).
65. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.
66. Id. at 278.
67. Id. at 269–70.
68. Id. at 270.
69. Id. at 279.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 279 n.25. For a proposed very different definition of discriminatory purpose
that calls on lawmakers to act as if they are unaware of the race (or sex) of the persons
affected by the law, see David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). According to Professor Strauss:
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purpose because “nothing in the record demonstrates that this
preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently
reenacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping
women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil
Service.”72
Finally, to the extent that the Court’s opinions in Davis, Arlington
Heights, and Feeney may not make entirely clear the logic of its
approach to disproportionate racial impact, the seminal article on
unconstitutional motive cited by Justice Powell in Arlington Heights
appears to fill in any gaps. In that article, Professor Paul Brest
addressed the question of when, if ever, a court should strike down a
law because it was adopted, in whole or part, to achieve an
unconstitutional purpose. His answer rested on two key concepts. First,
some purposes are constitutionally barred. 73 Second, although courts’
responsibility to enforce the Constitution typically requires them to
ensure that the products of the lawmaking process conform to
constitutional requirements, that responsibility also requires them to
ensure that the lawmaking process itself stays within constitutional
bounds.74 As Professor Brest explained:
The fact that a decisionmaker gives weight to an illicit objective may
determine the outcome of a decision. The decisionmaking process
consists of weighing the foreseeable and desirable consequences of
the proposed decision against its foreseeable costs . . . . To the extent
that the decisionmaker is illicitly motivated, he treats as a desirable
consequence one to which the lawfully motivated decisionmaker
would be indifferent or which he would view as undesirable.
. . . Assuming that a person has no legitimate complaint against a
particular decision merely because it affects him adversely, he does
have a legitimate complaint if it would not have been adopted but for
the decisionmaker’s consideration of illicit objectives. . . . 75

The formula that best captures this definition is what I will call the “reversing
the groups” test. A court applying the discriminatory intent standard should
ask: suppose the adverse effects of the challenged government decision fell on
whites instead of blacks, or on men instead of women. Would the decision have
been different? If the answer is yes, then the decision was made with
discriminatory intent.
Id. at 956–57.
72. Feeney, 442 U.S.at 279.
73. Brest, supra note 46, at 116 (“Governments are constitutionally prohibited from
pursuing certain objectives . . . .”); see also infra Part III.A.
74. Brest, supra note 46, at 116–18.
75. Id. at 116.
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Under this purity-of-process rationale, although courts generally must
allow the lawmaker broad discretion to weigh the costs and benefits of
possible courses of action, such deference is unwarranted when the
challenger can prove that the lawmaker has counted as a benefit the
achievement of an unconstitutional purpose. In such instances, the law
must be struck down unless the government can carry the “heavy
burden” of proving that counting the achievement of that purpose as a
benefit was essentially harmless error—“not determinative of the
outcome.”76
II. THE LIMITED PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
DAVIS–ARLINGTON HEIGHTS APPROACH
Intentionally or not, the approach that the Court formulated in Davis
and Arlington Heights was virtually hard-wired to be almost all bark
and no bite. Four factors in particular combined to ensure that the
approach would be of relatively little importance in practice. I discuss
each of those factors below, but before doing so, I should underline that
I do not mean to suggest that the contribution that the Court made in
Davis and Arlington Heights by repudiating the Palmer v. Thompson
approach was unimportant. The Palmer approach wrongly treated as
insuperable certain objections to invalidating a law because it was the
product of an unconstitutional purpose. Taken together, Justice
Powell’s majority opinion in Arlington Heights and Professor Brest’s
article on unconstitutional motive provide a solid rebuttal to Justice
Black’s reasons for preferring the Palmer approach. Even though the
Court in Davis and Arlington Heights opened a door through which very
few equal protection challenges could successfully pass, that was a
marked improvement over Palmer, which had slammed the door shut.
A. The Exceptionally High Bar
As the Court explained in Feeney, proving a racially or sexually
discriminatory purpose means proving that the lawmaker desired the
adverse effects the law has on racial minorities or women. In terms of
the cost–benefit balance described by Professor Brest, a legislature acts
with a racially discriminatory purpose when it counts those adverse
effects as a benefit, rather than a cost. Consider, for example, a certain
form of voter ID law that, if adopted, is apt to have a substantial
76. Id. at 117–18. To similar effect, see Justice Powell in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 270 n.21 (quoted supra text accompanying note 55). For a wide-ranging critique and
proposed reformulation of the significance of unconstitutional purpose under the Equal
Protection, Establishment, Free Exercise, and other Clauses, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016).
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disproportionate racial impact. A legislature acts with a racially
discriminatory purpose if it treats that likely impact as a reason to
adopt the law, as opposed to a reason to reconsider the wisdom of
enacting the law.
In thinking about the kind of showing required to prove a racially
discriminatory purpose, it is helpful to ask what kind of people act with
racially discriminatory purposes. The short answer: thoroughgoing
racists, people who get gratification from making racial minorities
miserable. Proving that a racially discriminatory purpose was a
“motivating factor” in the lawmaker’s decision to adopt a particular law
therefore means showing that a significant proportion of those voting
for the law are eminently rotten people. With very rare exception, that
can’t help but be a very steep hill for the challenger to climb.
The Court’s approval of the laws in Arlington Heights and Feeney
nicely illustrates the point. Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in
Arlington Heights acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ request to rezone a
parcel of land to allow for the construction of low- and moderate-income
housing had triggered some racial tensions in the community.
According to Justice Powell, “[s]ome of the comments” at three public
meetings held by the local government “addressed what was referred to
as the ‘social issue’—the desirability or undesirability of introducing at
this location in Arlington Heights low- and moderate-income housing,
housing that would probably be racially integrated.” 77 The federal
appellate court whose judgment was later reversed by the Court gave a
more blunt and detailed description of the atmosphere in Arlington
Heights. The description leaves little doubt that the local government
officials charged with deciding the rezoning request must have foreseen
the racial impact of granting or denying the request when they
ultimately voted to deny it:
The instant case reflects the unfortunate fact that historically the
Chicago metropolitan area has been segregated in terms of
housing. . . .[T]he population of Arlington Heights in 1970 was
64,884, but only twenty-seven residents were black. The
four-township northwest Cook County area, of which Arlington
Heights is a part, had a population increase from 1960 to 1970 of
219,000 people, but only 170 of these were black. Indeed, the
percentage of blacks in this area actually decreased over this tenyear span while the percentage of the population in the entire
Chicago metropolitan area that was black increased from fourteen
percent to eighteen percent.

77. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 257–58.
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. . . Though the building of this project might have only minimal
effects in terms of alleviating the segregative housing problem for the
entire Chicago area, it might well result in increasing Arlington
Heights’ minority population by over one thousand percent. What is
even more crucial is that this suburb has not sponsored nor
participated in any low income housing developments, nor does the
record reflect any such plans for the future. Realistically, Lincoln
Green[, the proposed development,] appears to be the only
contemplated proposal for Arlington Heights that would be a step in
the direction of easing the problem of de facto segregated housing.
Thus, the rejection of Lincoln Green has the effect of perpetuating
both this residential segregation and Arlington Heights’ failure to
accept any responsibility for helping to solve this problem.78

The Arlington Heights Plan Commission had voted against
recommending to the village’s Board of Trustees that the Board approve
the rezoning request, and the Board had then voted to deny the request.
Under the circumstances described by the Court of Appeals, isn’t it fair
to assume that some of those voting against the request probably were
motivated at least in part by a racially discriminatory purpose? Didn’t
some of them probably count it as a plus that denying the request would
preserve residential segregation and fence out blacks? The above
excerpt strongly suggests that the Court of Appeals would have
answered “yes” to both questions. As an indication of how very steep a
hill a litigant must climb to get a court to strike down a law based on a
finding of a racially discriminatory purpose, it is therefore especially
instructive not only that the Supreme Court made no such finding but
that the Court of Appeals stopped short of doing so as well. 79
In contrast to Arlington Heights, there is no particular reason in
Feeney to suspect that any of the lawmakers who voted years ago for the
veterans’ preference statute under review in Feeney did so at least in
part because they valued its negative effect on the group—in this
instance, women—disproportionately impacted by the law. Feeney is
78. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 413–14
(7th Cir. 1975), rev’d & remanded, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
79. The Court of Appeals was reviewing the district court’s finding of no
discriminatory purpose, and it proceeded on the assumption that it could only reject that
finding if it concluded that the finding was clearly erroneous. Although the Court of
Appeals decided the case before the Supreme Court had decided Davis, it inquired into
purpose much as the Court would later do in Davis. If the Court of Appeals felt at all
constrained by the Court’s earlier decision in Palmer, it was not apparent. The Court of
Appeals made no mention of the case. It ultimately decided for the plaintiff on the ground
that the plaintiff had proven a racially discriminatory effect. In reversing, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its holding in Davis that a racially discriminatory effect is insufficient to
establish an equal protection violation.
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instructive, however, because it communicates with such clarity how
very depraved a mindset must be shown to establish a discriminatory
purpose. The legislators who voted for the statute when it was first
enacted in 1896, or who subsequently voted for any of the various
amendments between 1919 and 1968 to expand its coverage, could not
help but be aware that they were voting for a law that would be a boon
for many, many men and almost uniformly a disadvantage for women.
In competing for civil service positions, women would lose out
repeatedly to men simply because the men were veterans. It may well
be that, in voting for the law, few, if any, legislators counted the
disadvantage to women as a plus, but it does not seem a stretch to
charge the law’s supporters in the legislature with a fair amount of
insensitivity. In Professor Brest’s terms, the legislators may well have
regarded the disadvantage to women as a cost, but probably not nearly
as much of a cost as they should have seen it.80
At a minimum, rather than give veterans a virtually absolute
preference, the legislators could have opted for any of various types of
veterans’ preferences having less of a negative impact on women. 81
Under the Davis–Arlington Heights conception of discriminatory
purpose, however, the legislators had no obligation whatsoever to give
less drastic measures a moment’s thought. Under that conception, the
legislators could not fairly be charged with a discriminatory purpose in
enacting the Massachusetts veterans’ preference law because they were

80. Professor Siegel has underlined the incongruity of the Court’s approach in light of
empirical studies of racial and gender bias:
In defining discriminatory purpose, the Court did not consult sociological or
psychological studies of racial bias. Had it done so, it would have
encountered . . . studies demonstrat[ing] that many white Americans now view
overt racism as socially unacceptable and mute expression of their racially
biased opinions in public settings. . . . And an even larger body of literature
demonstrates that white Americans who embrace principles of racial equality
manifest unconscious forms of racial bias in diverse spheres of social life. In
sum, the sociological and psychological literature demonstrates that (1) racial
bias remains the norm among white Americans; but that (2) they are strongly
inhibited in expressing the racial attitudes they consciously hold, and often are
wholly unaware of the extent to which their conscious judgments are
unconsciously race based. Thus, the form of discriminatory purpose the Court
asked plaintiffs to prove in Feeney . . .is one that the sociological and
psychological studies of racial bias suggest plaintiffs will rarely be able to
prove. . . .129
129. For similar reasons, many forms of gender bias will elude detection under the
Feeney framework, as well. . . .

Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136–37 & n.129 (1997).
81. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 285 & n.2 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing “the range of less discriminatory alternatives available to assist veterans”).
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not trying to make women suffer. As far as the Davis–Arlington Heights
approach is concerned, the fact that the Massachusetts legislature,
which not coincidentally ranged in composition from all-male at the
time of the statute’s adoption to nearly all-male at the time it was last
amended before Feeney,82 may have been rather oblivious to women’s
needs in enacting and retaining the veterans’ preference law was
constitutionally beside the point.
B. The Sensitivity of the Charge
Although the Court in Palmer gave more weight to the sensitivity of
motive inquiries than that factor deserves, it was right to recognize that
in conducting motive inquiries, courts need to take the sensitivity of
those inquiries into account. It is no small thing for a court to charge a
state legislature with enacting a law for the purpose of disadvantaging
racial minorities. Such a charge is nothing less than an accusation that
a significant proportion of the legislators who voted to adopt a law are
such wretched individuals that they look for legislative opportunities to
make the lives of racial minorities miserable. For a court to level such a
charge against the legislature, which is essentially what a judicial
finding of a racially discriminatory purpose does, can’t help but have
some negative effect on the legislature. It also can’t help but place some
strain on the relation between the two institutions: When the court is a
state court, the strain is on the relation between coordinate branches in
the state system, and when the court is a federal court, the strain is on
federal–state relations. Palmer to the contrary notwithstanding, that is
no reason for a court to avoid motive inquiries altogether, but it is a
reason for a court not to level such a charge unless it is very certain
that the charge is warranted.
As Professor Bickel captured so well years ago with his term, “the
counter-majoritarian difficulty,”83 there is always some strain on the
system when a court strikes down legislation as unconstitutional. Some
invalidations for unconstitutionality, however, are worse than others,
82. When the veterans’ preference statute was enacted in 1896, the election of the
first women to serve in the Massachusetts legislature was still more than twenty-five
years away. See History of Women in Massachusetts Government, MASS. CAUCUS OF
WOMEN LEGISLATORS, http://www.mawomenscaucus.com/history-of-women-in-massachu
setts-government (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). In 1968, when the statute was last amended
prior to Feeney, women made up less than three percent of the Massachusetts legislature.
See Steve Koczela & Jake Rubinstein, How the Mass. Legislature Can Get Closer to
Gender Balance, WBUR NEWS, Dec. 6, 2017, https://www.wbur.org/news/
2017/12/06/beacon-hill-women-representation (“From 1970 to 2002, women made
remarkable gains, from less than 3 percent of lawmakers to 26 percent in 2002.”).
83. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (1962).
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and invalidating a law because it was a product of a racially
discriminatory legislative purpose is about as bad as it gets. By way of
contrast, consider, for example, the Court’s invalidation years ago of a
New York state law limiting voting in school district elections to
individuals who own or lease taxable real property in the district or
have children who attend school in the district. 84 The law was
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause by an individual
ineligible under the statute to vote in school district elections in the
district in which he lived. In its opinion, the Court asked whether “the
exclusion” effected by the legislation was “necessary to promote a
compelling state interest,”85 analyzed whether that standard was met
by the state’s argument in terms of an interest of limiting voting to
individuals “ ‘primarily interested’ in school affairs,” 86 and ultimately
concluded that it was not.87 Although the New York legislature surely
was not pleased to have its law struck down as unconstitutional by the
Court, the Court said nothing suggesting that the legislature was
populated by any but honorable people. A holding of unconstitutionality
predicated on a finding of a racially discriminatory legislative purpose
unmistakably sends a message of a very different, and much more
negative, sort.
C. A Blueprint for Avoiding Detection
Prior to Davis, racist lawmakers were more apt to make their racist
purposes explicit when doing so would be politically expedient. In his
article on unconstitutional motive, Professor Brest observed about the
pool closings that led to the litigation in Palmer v. Thompson: “Almost
everyone in Jackson, Mississippi, knew that the city closed its public
swimming pools solely to avoid integration.” 88 One reason that the city’s
racially discriminatory motive was such a matter of common knowledge
in Jackson is that Jackson’s mayor had been so vocal about his
opposition to racially integrated public pools. Faced in May 1962 with a
federal court order to desegregate the city’s public pools, the mayor had
stated publicly that “we are not going to have any intermingling.” 89 A

84. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
85. Id. at 630.
86. Id. at 631 (quoting argument by appellees).
87. Id. at 633 (“The requirements of [the statute] are not sufficiently tailored to
limiting the franchise to those ‘primarily interested’ in school affairs to justify the denial
of the franchise to appellant and members of his class.”).
88. Brest, supra note 46, at 95.
89. The mayor’s statement was quoted in a newspaper article in the Jackson Daily
News, and the article ultimately was made part of the record in the Supreme Court.
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year later, having made no effort to desegregate the pools, the mayor
was no less transparent about his motives. According to a front-page
newspaper article in May 1963, the mayor “said neither agitators nor
President Kennedy will change the determination of Jackson to retain
segregation.”90 If the Court in Palmer had not refused categorically even
to consider whether the city had closed its pools for a racially
discriminatory purpose, it would have had no real choice except to
invalidate the closings based on a finding that the city indeed had
closed its pools for invidious reasons. The facts at hand were truly that
overwhelming.
Davis and Arlington Heights made clear that racist lawmakers
announce their racist purposes at their peril. Under the Davis–
Arlington Heights approach, laws that would not have been adopted but
for a racially discriminatory purpose must fall, and statements by
lawmakers that are as overtly racist as the Jackson mayor’s remarks
are smoking guns that can spell a law’s doom. Thus forewarned by
Davis and Arlington Heights (or at least by legislative counsel familiar
with Davis and Arlington Heights), racist lawmakers needn’t be
especially savvy to recognize that, however politically expedient it may
seem to speak openly about their racist purposes, such candor easily
can prove a law’s undoing. By taking care to speak for the record in a
much less transparent, and much more race-neutral, way than the
Jackson mayor had spoken, racist lawmakers present a much more
difficult target for a discriminatory purpose challenge.
With its enumeration of “subjects of proper inquiry,” 91 Arlington
Heights makes proof of a racially discriminatory purpose more elusive
in another way. Very simply, that enumeration serves as a useful
don’t-do list for racist lawmakers. Be careful, for example, to avoid
“[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,” and be mindful in
drafting minutes of meetings and committee reports that they may be
scrutinized at a later time for damning “legislative or administrative
history.”92
In short, it is no accident that the highwater mark for prevailing in
the Supreme Court based on proof of a racially discriminatory purpose

Citing to the record, Justice White quoted the statement in his dissent. Palmer, 403 U.S.
at 250 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
90. This article, like the one mentioned supra note 89, appeared in the Jackson Daily
News, became part of the Palmer record in the Supreme Court, and was cited as such and
quoted in Justice White’s dissent. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 250 (White, J., joined by Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
91. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
92. Id. at 267–68.
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came in two cases, Rogers v. Lodge93 in 1982 and Hunter v.
Underwood94 in 1985, in which the evidence of such purpose predated
Davis and Arlington Heights. In Rogers v. Lodge, the Court sustained
an equal protection challenge to an at-large system of elections that a
Georgia county had instituted in 1911. The Court held that, even
though the system may not have been instituted to dilute black
residents’ voting power, it had been maintained for that racially
discriminatory purpose.95 In so holding, the Court relied heavily on the
federal district court’s “detailed findings of fact.” 96 Notably, although
the Court decided Rogers six years after Davis, the suit was filed in
1976—the year that Davis was decided and a year before Arlington
Heights—and virtually all of the evidence cited in those findings went
back a number of years.
The evidence of racially discriminatory purpose that the Court found
dispositive in Hunter all dated back further than any of the evidence in
Rogers—to be precise, to 1901, when the Alabama Constitutional
Convention adopted the particular constitutional provision at issue in
Hunter. The provision expanded the list of specific offenses for which an
individual would be disenfranchised if convicted and added a catchall
provision for crimes “involving moral turpitude.” 97 Unlike Rogers, which
was decided by a 6-3 vote, Hunter offered evidence of racially
discriminatory purpose so overwhelming that the same group of
Justices found such a purpose without dissent. Writing for the Court,
then-Justice (soon-to-be Chief Justice) Rehnquist—one of the Rogers
dissenters—underlined the multitude of evidence of racially
discriminatory purpose coming from the mouths of the delegates to the
Alabama Constitutional Convention. As he explained:
The delegates to the all-white convention were not secretive about
their purpose. John B. Knox, president of the convention, stated in
his opening address: ‘And what is it that we want to do? Why it is,
within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish

93. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
94. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
95. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626-27.
96. Id. at 616. The Court emphasized that under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court’s findings of fact had to be accepted unless clearly erroneous,
and the Court made clear that the findings of fact to be given such deference included the
trial court’s ultimate finding of a racially discriminatory purpose as well as “subsidiary
findings of fact.” Id. at 622–23.
97. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226 (quoting the Alabama provision).
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white supremacy in this State.’ . . . [Z]eal for white supremacy ran
rampant at the convention.98

Whatever racist legislators may be thinking to themselves, we can’t
expect them after Davis and Arlington Heights to be nearly as
forthcoming about their racially discriminatory purposes as the
Alabama Constitutional Convention delegates were in 1901.
D. Lawmakers’ Ever-Increasing Abilities to Camouflage Racially
Discriminatory Purposes
In some ways, it is difficult not to look back with a certain degree of
nostalgia on the days of Gomillion v. Lightfoot,99 when lawmakers were
apt to implement their racially discriminatory purposes by means that
did not keep those purposes particularly well hidden. In Gomillion, a
1960 decision, the Supreme Court had before it a challenge to an
Alabama statute of 1957 that redrew the boundaries of Tuskegee.
According to the complaint, which the federal district and appellate
courts below had dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted, the Alabama legislature had changed the shape of
Tuskegee from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure, and the change
had the effect of disenfranchising from city elections all but a handful of
the four hundred blacks previously eligible to vote in Tuskegee elections
and none of the whites.100 In an opinion for a unanimous Court
reversing the judgment below and remanding for trial, Justice
Frankfurter explained that if the challengers could prove their
allegations at trial:
the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is
solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing
Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing
municipal vote.
It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudging a
statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the principles
by which this Court must judge, and uniformly has judged, statutes
that, howsoever speciously defined, obviously discriminate against
colored citizens . . . .101

98. Id. at 229.
99. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
100. Id. at 341.
101. Id. at 341–42. In summarizing the challengers’ allegations, Justice Frankfurter
memorably described Tuskegee’s shape after the 1957 statute as “an uncouth
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As documented in the lengthy report that the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights released in 2018, lawmakers seeking to disadvantage racial
minorities have been able to take advantage of advances in data
collection and analysis to craft less obvious, better disguised, means of
disenfranchising racial minorities or reducing the impact of their
votes.102 Writing in 1994 for a Supreme Court majority that included
Chief Justice Rehnquist—someone whom no one would be tempted to
describe as reflexively pro-plaintiff in race discrimination cases—
Justice Souter noted the “demonstrated ingenuity of state and local
governments in hobbling minority voting power”103 and quoted the
finding in a 1982 Senate report that various “jurisdictions have
substantially moved from direct, over[t] impediments to the right to
vote to more sophisticated devices that dilute minority voting
strength.”104 Particularly because lawmakers have “easier access” than
any would-be challengers “to data and analysis regarding the impact of
a particular change,”105 the superficially race-neutral barriers that some
states and localities have developed are much more difficult to attack
for discriminatory purpose than the older, cruder means. A political
scientist’s description of the barriers that disproportionately kept racial
minorities from voting in the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election,
which pitted former Georgia House Minority Leader Stacey Abrams
against then-Secretary of State Brian Kemp, makes clear how varied
and effective such barriers can be:
[Kemp] had created such an obstacle course of discrimination, no one
can really say that the election was fair. As secretary of state during
the campaign, he held 53,000 voter registrations hostage under the
exact match law, which penalized typos, missing hyphens and other
tiny things. Seven out of 10 of those registrations came from black
voters, who made up only around 30 percent of eligible voters. He
purged rolls, reduced the number of polling machines and did many
other things to limit the impact of black voters in the state. . . .106

twenty-eight-sided figure” and “a strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure.” Id. at
341.
102. In particular, see chapters 3 (“Recent Changes in Voting Laws and Procedures
That Impact Minority Voters”) and 6 (“Findings and Recommendations”) in U.S. COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10.
103. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994).
104. Id.
105. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 279.
106. Melanye Price, Stacey Abrams Is Playing the Long Game for Our Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), http://nytimes.com/2019/08/15/opinion/stacey-abrams-elections.
html.

[6] RACIALLY NEUTRAL IN FORM - BP (EDITS INCORPORATED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/13/2020 10:51 AM

RACIALLY NEUTRAL IN FORM

835

The products of this “evolution of voting discrimination into more
subtle second-generation barriers”107 are not always so resistant to an
attack predicated on an alleged racially discriminatory purpose. As
illustrated, however, by North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
McCrory108—one of the rare cases in which a facially race-neutral
barrier has fallen to a discriminatory purpose attack—a high level of
unwitting transparency and downright bumbling on the part of
lawmakers is almost a prerequisite for such an attack to succeed. North
Carolina was one of various jurisdictions that for decades had been
bound by the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act to make no
changes in its voting procedures without first receiving federal approval
(“preclearance”). When the Supreme Court in 2013 in Shelby County v.
Holder109 held that the Act’s coverage formula could no longer
constitutionally be applied and that the jurisdictions coming within
that formula were freed of the Act’s preclearance requirement, the
North Carolina legislature wasted no time swinging into action. “[O]n
the day after the Supreme Court issued Shelby County v. Holder,”
Judge Motz recounted for a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel:
a leader of the party that newly dominated the legislature (and the
party that rarely enjoyed African American support) announced an
intention to enact what he characterized as an “omnibus” election
law. Before enacting that law, the legislature requested data on the
use, by race, of a number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the race
data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted voting
and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately
affected African Americans.
In response to claims that intentional racial discrimination
animated its action, the State offered only meager justifications.
Although the new provisions target African Americans with almost
surgical precision, they constitute inapt remedies for the problems
assertedly justifying them and, in fact, impose cures for problems
that did not exist. . . .110

Among the eye-opening “historical background evidence”111 discussed by
the court in support of its conclusion that the various changes put in

107. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 593 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
109. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
110. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 214.
111. Id. at 227. As the court had noted, id. at 220, the “historical background” of the
law under review was one of the factors that the Court in Arlington Heights had identified
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place by the North Carolina legislature were all traceable to a
discriminatory racial intent was the justification that the state had
argued before the district court for the provision in the act shortening
the early voting period from seventeen days to ten. Judge Motz’s
description of the state’s purported justification captures the high level
of bumbling on the part of the state that enabled the challengers to
succeed even though the typical challenger seeking a discriminatory
purpose invalidation faces insurmountable hurdles to success:
As “evidence of justifications” for the changes to early voting, the
State offered purported inconsistencies in voting hours across
counties, including the fact that only some counties had decided to
offer Sunday voting. The State then elaborated on its justification,
explaining that “[c]ounties with Sunday voting in 2014 were
disproportionately black” and “disproportionately Democratic.” In
response, [the Act] did away with one of the two days of Sunday
voting. Thus, in what comes as close to a smoking gun as we are
likely to see in modern times, the State’s very justification for a
challenged statute hinges explicitly on race—specifically its concern
that African Americans, who had overwhelmingly voted for
Democrats, had too much access to the franchise.112

III. THE NARROWNESS AND INCOMPLETENESS OF THE
DAVIS–ARLINGTON HEIGHTS APPROACH
In and of itself, the fact that the Davis–Arlington Heights approach
under the Equal Protection Clause to laws having a disproportionate
racial impact does little to root out racial bias in lawmaking does not
necessarily mean that the approach fails to give the clause its due.
However, in light of the historic national commitment to racial equality
reflected in the Equal Protection Clause, 113 racial bias in lawmaking is
sufficiently problematic that the approach’s very limited utility in
rooting out such bias should lead one to question whether the approach

as an important factor for a court to consider in deciding whether or not a racially
discriminatory purpose had been proved.
112. Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
113. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (discussing “the historical
fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States”); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880) (“What is this [the Fourteenth Amendment] but declaring that
the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color?”).
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does justice to the clause. I maintain below that the approach cannot
overcome any such doubts.
As discussed in Part I, the Court in Davis and Arlington Heights
assumed that the constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause
of the governmental action under review turned entirely on whether the
action was traceable to a purpose of discriminating against racial
minorities. I have no difficulty with the Court’s asking in both cases
whether the government action was based on a racially discriminatory
purpose. I also have no difficulty with its answer in both instances that
a racially discriminatory purpose had not been proven to be a
motivating factor. I part ways with the Court, however, on the validity
of limiting its analysis in both cases to discriminatory purpose. The
disproportionate racial impact that the challengers in both cases made
the centerpiece of their claims had independent importance that the
Court’s single-minded focus on discriminatory purpose wrongly denied.
In essence, the Court erred in treating a sufficient condition for
invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause as a necessary one.
A. The Question Addressed
In the article that the Court cited, and relied upon heavily, in
fashioning its Davis–Arlington Heights approach,114 Professor Brest
masterfully argued that a law should be struck down if it would not
have been enacted but for the lawmaker’s treating an unconstitutional
purpose as a reason for enactment. As indicated by Professor Brest’s
express mention of Palmer v. Thompson in the article’s title, Palmer—
the Jackson, Mississippi swimming-pool desegregation case discussed
earlier115—was the immediate impetus to his writing the article. Palmer
plainly
involved
government
action
that
disproportionately
disadvantaged racial minorities: Although the city’s closure of its public
swimming pools in response to a court order to desegregate them
deprived all of Jackson’s residents, whatever their race, of the
opportunity to swim in an integrated public swimming pool, it
stigmatized only Jackson’s African American residents. As Professor
Brest simply, but memorably, stated in the opening line of his article,
“Almost everyone in Jackson, Mississippi, knew that the city closed its
public swimming pools solely to avoid integration.” 116
Although Professor Brest used Palmer as a springboard to a broader
discussion of, and proposed approach to, the problem of

114. Brest, supra note 46.
115. See supra Part I.
116. Brest, supra note 46, at 95.
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unconstitutional purposes, his focus, unlike the Court’s in Davis and
Arlington Heights, was not what significance to give to disproportionate
racial impact. Instead, it was the very different question raised by the
Court’s refusal in Palmer even to consider the possibility that the
government action was the result of an unconstitutional purpose. In
setting forth his approach, Professor Brest made clear in the first of the
approach’s four steps that his topic was not disproportionate racial
impact, but rather unconstitutional purpose, and that the range of
unconstitutional purposes that his approach was intended to address
was not limited to racially discriminatory purposes, but rather included
unconstitutional purposes of any kind: “1. Governments are
constitutionally prohibited from pursing certain objectives—for
example, the disadvantaging of a racial group, the suppression of a
religion, or the deterring of interstate migration.” 117
In short, in fashioning its approach to challenges based on a law’s
disproportionate racial impact, the Court in Davis and Arlington
Heights drew heavily on an approach fashioned to resolve challenges of
an entirely different kind—ones based on a law’s alleged roots in an
unconstitutional purpose. To be sure, there was nothing wrong with the
Court’s asking whether the governmental action in Davis and Arlington
Heights should be struck down on the basis of an unconstitutional
purpose. For the reasons discussed in Part II, it would have been quite
remarkable if the Court in either case had invalidated the
governmental action on that basis or even proceeded past the threshold
inquiry of whether the challengers had shown that an unconstitutional
purpose had been a motivating factor. Nonetheless, the fact that the
Court was very unlikely to conclude that a constitutional attack based
on unconstitutional purpose deserved to prevail certainly did not mean
the Court was wrong to consider the possibility, even if only to dismiss
it with relative ease. The Court erred neither in considering the
possibility nor in rejecting it, but in taking so narrow a view of the
protections guaranteed to racial minorities by the Equal Protection
Clause.
Before turning to the broader protections that the clause offers and
that the Court in Davis and Arlington Heights ignored, I should
underline how very narrow the inquiry framed by the Davis–Arlington
Heights approach really is. In particular, although it may be tempting
to understand the approach as reflective to some extent of the concern
with racial discrimination that lies at the heart of the Equal Protection
Clause, the approach reflects nothing of the sort. In fact, it is fully
divorced from any special sensitivity to matters of race. To explain why
117. Id. at 116.
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this is so, I need to turn briefly to a question that the Court did not
address in Davis or Arlington Heights and, to the best of my knowledge,
is yet to address explicitly with any degree of care: What makes a
purpose unconstitutional?
Professor Brest’s identification, noted above, of “the disadvantaging
of a racial group” and “the suppression of a religion” as examples of
unconstitutional purposes points the way to an explanation. Both
examples have strong intuitive appeal as obviously correct, and I
believe they do because they treat as desirable—as something the
government would do well to achieve—an outcome that is totally at
odds with a core commitment made by a constitutional prohibition or
guarantee.118
Consider the purpose of “the disadvantaging of a racial group.” At the
most basic level the Equal Protection Clause, “No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” 119
means that it is unconstitutional for a state to have as its objective the
unequal treatment of some persons. The state can treat groups
unequally—better or worse than one another—as a means to some
legitimate end, but it cannot treat some people worse than others
because it sees unequal treatment as a good thing, in and of itself. From
that perspective, it makes no difference whether the state is claiming
that its purpose is to disadvantage blacks, poor whites, gays and
lesbians, hippies, gun owners, or billionaires. Whatever the group, the
state cannot consistently with the Equal Protection Clause have as its
purpose to disadvantage them.120
118. The explanation is mine, not Professor Brest’s. As perhaps some indication either
that he did not regard offering an explanation as essential to his project or that he had
not yet formulated an explanation he felt comfortable exposing to critical scrutiny in the
text, Professor Brest relegated his explanation to a footnote, where he briefly stated:
These particular objectives are proscribed because their pursuit is detrimental
to society at large, or because it is unjust to disadvantage persons for
possessing certain attributes, or for both reasons. A decision made for the
purpose of disadvantaging a particular racial, ethnic, or religious minority,
moreover, inflicts a stigmatic injury distinct from the operative consequences of
the law: the act of adoption is itself an official insult to the minority.
Id. at 116 n.109. For now, suffice it to say that I see no reason to press my disagreement
with his explanation. To avoid possible confusion as to my own conception of what counts
as an unconstitutional purpose, I only note that although I fully agree with his
identification of “the disadvantaging of a racial group” as an example of an
unconstitutional purpose, I disagree with his apparent suggestion in the footnote quoted
above that “the disadvantaging of a racial group” is only an unconstitutional purpose if
the racial group is a racial minority.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. As Justice Brennan explained for the Court in U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of
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the laws’ means anything, it must, at the very least, mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.” In Moreno the Court struck down a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act of
1964 that limited participation in the food stamp program to households whose members
are all related to one another. In the course of discussing whether the amendment had the
rational basis required to satisfy the demands of equal protection (which, in this case
involving federal governmental activity, applied by virtue of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, see supra note 32), Justice Brennan made clear that the government
could not constitutionally defend the amendment in terms of the purpose suggested by the
“little legislative history . . . that does exist”—a purpose “to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and
‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.” Moreno, 413 U.S. at
534.
Believe it or not, a purpose of disadvantaging poor whites was raised as a defense
in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), to an argument that the law at hand—one
disenfranchising anyone convicted of a crime “involving moral turpitude”—should be
struck down because it was enacted for the purpose of disadvantaging blacks. As the
Court explained, the state essentially conceded that a purpose of disadvantaging blacks
was a “motivating factor” for adopting the law, but maintained that “the existence of a
permissible motive for [the law], namely, the disenfranchisement of poor whites, trumps
any proof of a parallel impermissible motive.” Id. at 231–32. Without expressly rejecting
the state’s characterization of a purpose of disenfranchising poor whites as legitimate, the
Court held that the state’s attempt to use that purpose as a defense necessarily failed
because it was “beyond peradventure” that a purpose to disadvantage blacks “was a
‘but-for’ motivation for the enactment.” Id. at 232. Hunter is discussed more fully supra
Part II.C. For an interesting recent dissection of the Court’s opinion in Hunter, see
Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1144–49
(2018) (using the Court’s opinion in Hunter to illustrate the need for courts in cases
requiring analysis of mixed motives to employ a “precise descriptive vocabulary” of the
sort proposed in the article).
Most obviously, a purpose of disadvantaging gays and lesbians lay at the heart of
the Court’s invalidation in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) and United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) of, respectively: a Colorado constitutional amendment
nullifying any Colorado state or local law protecting gays and lesbians from
discrimination; and a section of an Act of Congress (the Defense of Marriage Act)
establishing that, as used in any federal law, “marriage” refers only to a legal union of an
opposite-sex couple and “spouse” refers only to one’s partner in an opposite-sex marriage.
According to Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in both cases, each provision under
review was explicable only in terms of a purpose of disadvantaging gays and lesbians and
that purpose was unconstitutional. For a critique of the Court’s resting its decision in
Windsor on that purpose and the view that it should have relied on the Establishment
Clause instead, see Gary J. Simson, Religion’s Role in Bans on Same-Sex Marriage, NAT’L
L.J., Apr. 14, 2014, at 34.
Finally, as should be apparent, I do not draw on particular precedent in
identifying a purpose of disadvantaging gun owners or billionaires as unconstitutional.
Given the relative political power of gun owners and billionaires, it would be surprising,
to say the least, for any lawmaker to legislate to the disadvantage of gun owners or
billionaires out of a deep-seated desire to do them harm. In fact, it is precisely the very
minimal likelihood that lawmakers in legislating would count disadvantage to gun owners
or billionaires as a plus in and of itself that prompts me to name gun owners and
billionaires in my list. If and when a lawmaker ever decides to legislate out of animus
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Professor Brest’s use of “the suppression of a religion” as another
example of an unconstitutional purpose is so apt for similar reasons.
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion],”121 tells us at a
minimum that people’s freedom to practice their religion is valued and
that a lawmaker cannot treat the diminution of that freedom as a good
thing. In certain instances, a legislature may be able to justify
diminishing that freedom in some way as a means to a legitimate end.
However, it cannot have as its objective to diminish some people’s
autonomy to practice their religion.
In short, the Court in Davis and Arlington Heights was correct to
treat a purpose of disadvantaging racial minorities as unconstitutional,
but its treating that purpose as unconstitutional had nothing to do with
any sense that disadvantaging racial minorities calls for special
scrutiny. Instead, it simply followed from the fact that a purpose of
disadvantaging any particular group, like a purpose of diminishing
religious exercise, abridging freedom of speech, or fostering
unreasonable searches and seizures, contradicts the core meaning of a
constitutional prohibition or guarantee.
B. The Question Ignored
Under
the
Davis–Arlington
Heights
approach,
a
law’s
disproportionate impact on racial minorities may be used to help prove
a racially discriminatory purpose, but it has no independent importance
in and of itself. If the law cannot be shown to be the product of a
racially discriminatory purpose, the disproportionate racial impact is
beside the point. To put it somewhat differently, the fact that a law
disproportionately disadvantages racial minorities has no more
inherent constitutional importance than the fact that a law may
disproportionately disadvantage lawyers, car dealers, or coin collectors.
If that seems surprising in light of what the Supreme Court long ago
called “the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from
official sources in the State,”122 it should. If it seems even more
surprising in light of the Court’s inference from that historical fact and
other sources that classifications disadvantaging racial minorities
should be treated as suspect, it should as well.
toward gun owners or billionaires, those groups will be no less protected from such an
unconstitutional purpose than groups much more likely to be the target of such invidious
lawmaking.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
122. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
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Strictly speaking, of course, a law that disproportionately
disadvantages racial minorities is not a racial classification and
therefore does not automatically trigger the “strict scrutiny” that the
Court has demanded when racial classifications are under review. In
holding that racial classifications should be treated as suspect, the
Court has made clear that its focus is laws that explicitly use race as a
basis for treating some people better than others. Although the Court
has gravitated to the position that all racial classifications are suspect
and call for strict scrutiny regardless of whether they explicitly
disadvantage or advantage racial minorities123—a position with which a
number of Justices and commentators, including myself, have
disagreed124—the doctrine of race as a suspect classification plainly
originated with judicial review of laws classifying to the disadvantage of
racial minorities. For purposes of clarity and simplicity, I will discuss
the implications of suspect classification doctrine for laws having a
disproportionate racial impact with the paradigm case of racial
classifications disadvantaging racial minorities foremost in mind.
Lawmakers routinely classify—treat people differently in order to
serve the legislative goal.125 With rare exception, lawmakers do not
attempt to serve their goal with precision. To do so would often cost
more in individualized decisionmaking than they believe serving the
goal is worth, or it might give more discretion than they think advisable
to a court or other decisionmaker vested with enforcing the law.
In deciding whether a legislative classification comports with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s command to deny no one the “equal
protection of the laws,” the courts have long deferred to these legislative
realities and given lawmakers great latitude to classify imprecisely. As
long as the classification bears a rational relationship to the lawmaker’s
objective, the courts will almost always allow the law to stand, and the
measure of rationality is comparative generalization: Is a member of
the group disadvantaged by the classification at all more likely than a
member of the group advantaged by the classification to contribute to
the problem that the law seeks to eliminate or diminish?
123. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 223–27 (1995).
124. See, e.g., id. at 243–49 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356–62 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); John Hart Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974);
Gary J. Simson, Separate but Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 443,
454–55 & nn. 60 & 61 (2005).
125. For a still-unrivaled discussion of equal protection and the classification process,
see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 343–53 (1949).

[6] RACIALLY NEUTRAL IN FORM - BP (EDITS INCORPORATED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

RACIALLY NEUTRAL IN FORM

4/13/2020 10:51 AM

843

To use a classic example: 126 Many years ago, in an effort to cut down
on traffic distractions, New York City adopted an ordinance that
prohibited any truck from carrying advertisements on the outside of the
truck for businesses other than the truck owner’s. Although some truck
owners advertising their own businesses may well create more of a
traffic distraction than some truck owners advertising other people’s
businesses, the Supreme Court was willing to let the classification
stand. As explained most clearly in a concurring opinion, the rational
basis for the classification apparently lay in the comparative
generalization that “in a day of extravagant advertising,” a truck owner
advertising other people’s businesses would be apt to create a greater
distraction than a truck owner only advertising his or her own
business.127
When the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of suspect
classification and recognized racial classifications as suspect, it
established a standard of review that turned the usual judicial
deference to legislative classification on its head. Under that “strict
scrutiny” standard, a court deciding the constitutionality of a racial
classification must not display the customary tolerance for imprecision
in classification. Rather, it must strike down the classification if the
state could have pursued its objective more precisely. In addition, even
a precise classification must fall unless the objective pursued is of
compelling importance.128
Although the Court has never stated definitively what, in its view,
makes a classification suspect,129 the two factors that it appears to treat
126. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). To illustrate the
operation of the traditional rational basis test and the great deference that the test
affords to lawmakers, Railway Express is a favorite of constitutional law casebook
authors. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 741–43 (5th ed. 2017);
JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 1333–
35 (12th ed. 2015).
127. Ry. Express, 336 U.S. at 117 (Jackson, J., concurring). At the time Railway
Express was decided, the Supreme Court was still more than twenty years away from
holding in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976), that commercial advertising is a form of speech entitled to significant
First Amendment protection. Under Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942),
commercial advertising fell outside the scope of the Free Speech Clause, and laws
regulating it were treated as simply economic regulations.
128. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 514 (2005); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
129. In explaining whether a particular type of classification is suspect or not, the
Court typically has mentioned one or more factors as influencing its determination of
suspectness. Although the factor(s) it has mentioned as influencing one determination
often overlap with the factor(s) mentioned as influencing another, the factor(s) mentioned
do vary to some extent from case to case. Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
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as most important both seem to derive their importance from their
impact on the trustworthiness of the classification process. One factor,
the disadvantaged group’s relatively limited political power, 130 raises
doubts about the fairness and objectivity of the classification process
because, with little to lose from unfairly disadvantaging such a group
and often with little occasion and incentive to get to know members of
that group well, legislators are much more likely than usual to legislate
on the basis of unfairly negative stereotypes about the group. The other
factor that appears to figure most prominently in the Court’s calculus of
what makes a classification suspect is intense societal prejudice against
the disadvantaged group.131 The reason it should fuel skepticism about
the fairness of a legislative process that produces a classification
disadvantaging the group is even more apparent. If legislators are apt
to form unfair negative stereotypes about a group with relatively
limited political power, they are apt to form even more negative

191–92 (1964), with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 n.14 (1982). The Court’s single
most illuminating statement on the factors it sees as important to a determination of
suspectness is probably its opening statement in the lengthy footnote in Plyler that I just
cited: “Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as
‘suspect.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). For the Court to say about its own determinations of
suspectness that several factors “might” explain what it has been doing seems to me a
very definitive statement that the Court has every intention of keeping its options open
and avoiding a commitment to one or more factors as necessary or sufficient or both.
130. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Gary J. Simson, Note, Mental Illness: A
Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1245–58 (1974). In calling in the latter Note
for an inquiry into the disadvantaged group’s political power, I saw the inquiry as a
logical extension of Professor Ely’s “we-they” theory and the suspicion-of-process theme
underlying it, as set forth in John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933–35 & n.85 (1973), and in an earlier unpublished paper by
Professor Ely. See Simson, Note, supra, at 1245 n.37. To determine whether laws
disadvantaging a particular group merit the exacting judicial review afforded suspect
classifications, I suggested that the key should be whether the disadvantaged group is “a
prototype of the ‘discrete and insular minorities’ of which Mr. Justice Stone speaks in his
famous Carolene Products footnote.” Id. at 1254 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). Drawing heavily on Justice Stone’s characterization, I
identified four criteria as “particularly relevant” to the determination. Id. at 1255–57
(“whether the group has the right to vote,” “whether the group is a minority in the general
population,” “how insular the group is,” and “whether the group has been repeatedly
disadvantaged . . . by legislative classifications”). For a later application of the approach,
see Gary J. Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40
UC DAVIS L. REV. 313, 370–72 (2006) (maintaining that classifications on the basis of
sexual orientation should be treated as suspect).
131. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 443 (1985);
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216–17 n.14.
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stereotypes about a group that many of their constituents, and
presumably many of themselves, regard with animus. 132
If the essence of the Court’s treatment of racial classifications as
suspect is a distrust of the legislative process when legislators classify
to the disadvantage of racial minorities, a question naturally arises
when legislators pass laws that, on their face, do not classify on the
basis of race but that foreseeably have a disproportionate adverse effect
on racial minorities: Even if the reasons that spark suspicion of the
lawmaking process when lawmakers explicitly classify on the basis of
race may not apply as strongly in this context, don’t they continue to
apply with substantial force? I maintain that they do and that respect
for the Court’s recognition long ago that racial classifications should be
treated as suspect calls for the Court to revise its approach in Davis and
Arlington Heights and begin treating disproportionate racial impact as
a matter of independent constitutional importance.
Treating disproportionate racial impact as constitutionally important
in and of itself is not only a logical extension of the recognition of race
as a suspect classification. It is also much more psychologically realistic
than an approach, like the Court’s in Davis and Arlington Heights, that
insists that disproportionate racial impact is worthy of attention only
insofar as it may shed light on whether the lawmaker, in enacting the
law under review, counted the law’s adverse effect on racial minorities
as a positive reason for enactment. The Davis–Arlington Heights
approach treats racial bias on the part of lawmakers as a problem only
when such bias takes truly virulent form: The lawmaker in weighing
the costs and benefits of adopting a particular law consciously puts
“disadvantages racial minorities” in the benefits column. Racial bias
may figure into lawmakers’ thinking, however —as it may figure into
the thinking of other members of society—in more subtle, but still very
troubling, ways.
132. Two other factors also figure prominently in the Justices’ discussions of what
makes a basis for classification suspect: whether there is a history of laws discriminating
against the disadvantaged group, see, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976) (per curiam); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (plurality
opinion); and whether the basis for classification is an unchangeable characteristic, see,
e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion). A history
of discrimination may figure in the Court’s thinking primarily as an indicator of lack of
political power. See Simson, Note, supra note 130, at 1257. Unchangeable characteristic
appears to be the factor that the Court has assigned the least significance in determining
suspectness. Most obviously, alienage and religion—two of the four bases for classification
that the Court has called suspect, see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam) (listing race, religion, and alienage as suspect); Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72
(listing race, nationality, and alienage as suspect)—are changeable. The three other
factors are met by all four bases for classification.
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Thanks to the ever-growing literature on “implicit bias” (also often
called “unconscious bias”),133 it is now a matter of common knowledge
that we all perceive the world through individual lenses shaped to some
extent by preconceived notions of which we are often unaware. Some of
those preconceived notions, even if not entirely accurate, may be
relatively innocuous, but preconceived negative notions about members
of races other than our own hardly meet that description. As a result of
implicit bias, a lawmaker weighing a proposed law’s costs and benefits
may put “disadvantages racial minorities” in the cost column but count
it as less of a negative than a more objective observer would. Or
perhaps the lawmaker may treat “disadvantages racial minorities” as a
matter of indifference—neither a cost nor a benefit. Either way, Davis
and Arlington Heights to the contrary notwithstanding, the lawmaker’s
racially biased determination deserves to be treated as a serious equal
protection problem.134 In Part IV, which follows, I propose more
specifically the form that such treatment might take.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO DISPROPORTIONATE RACIAL IMPACT
If a law expressly treats people differently on the basis of race to the
disadvantage of racial minorities, there is no room for debate as to
133. See, e.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489 (2005).
134. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (1987):
[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced
by unconscious racial motivation.
There are two explanations for the unconscious nature of our racially
discriminatory beliefs and ideas. First, Freudian theory states that the human
mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to
recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual
has learned is good or right. While our historical experience has made racism
an integral part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal
that rejects racism as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict
between racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind
excludes his racism from consciousness.
Second, the theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture—
including, for example, the media and an individual’s parents, peers, and
authority figures—transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Because these
beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not experienced as explicit
lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual’s rational ordering of her
perceptions of the world. . . .
....
. . . The equal protection clause requires the elimination of governmental
decisions that take race into account without good and important reasons.
Therefore, equal protection doctrine must find a way to come to grips with
unconscious racism.
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whether the lawmakers were aware of the negative consequences of
their lawmaking for racial minorities. Clearly they were. By the same
token, in such instances, there is also no room for debate as to whether
in crafting the law the legislators proceeded on the basis of comparative
generalizations about racial minorities and the racial majority. Clearly
they did. In calling for strict scrutiny of racial classifications, the
Supreme Court indicated its exceptionally high degree of distrust of the
fairness of a legislative process in which lawmakers engage in
comparative generalizations about racial groups and arrive at a result
that singles out racial minorities for disadvantage. In effect, the Court
has told courts to assume that the legislators acted on the basis of
unfair stereotypes unless the state can show that the classification
serves a state interest of the highest order as precisely as possible.
If a law does not classify along racial lines but disproportionately
disadvantages racial minorities, it is not so clear that the legislators in
adopting the law were aware of its adverse consequences for racial
minorities and proceeded on the basis of comparative generalizations
about racial groups. If they in fact were unaware of the negative
consequences for racial minorities when they adopted the law, there is
no reason to think that they engaged at the time in comparative
generalizations about racial groups; and if they were not engaged in
comparative generalizations about racial groups, the concern about
unfair stereotyping and an unfair legislative process that I believe are
central to the Court’s treatment of racial classifications as suspect also
does not come into play. Under the circumstances, the disproportionate
racial impact would not justify requiring that the law have more than
the minimal level of reasonableness that any law must have to survive.
If, however, the legislators were aware that a law would have a
disproportionate impact on racial minorities and enacted it nonetheless,
there is good reason to think that in enacting it they engaged,
consciously or subconsciously, in comparative generalizations about
racial groups that probably reflected unfair stereotypes. Under the
circumstances, more than rational basis review is warranted, even if
not the strict scrutiny that is warranted when the legislators explicitly
classify on the basis of race and mete out advantages and disadvantages
entirely along racial lines.
I suggest the following as an approach to disproportionate racial
impact that gives disproportionate racial impact the independent
importance and weight it deserves:
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1. A party bringing an equal protection challenge to a law135 on the
basis of an alleged disproportionate racial impact bears the burden of
proving that the law in operation disadvantages racial minorities in
one or more respects136 at a substantially higher rate than
nonminorities. If the challenger fails to carry that burden, the equal
protection challenge fails.
2. If the challenger is able to carry the burden prescribed in step 1,
the challenger prevails unless the government can prove that either:
a. The lawmaker at the time of adopting the law did not foresee,
and with due diligence could not reasonably have foreseen, a
substantial disproportionate racial impact; or
b. The law bears a substantial relationship to an important
governmental interest.

In formulating the above approach, I resolved several matters in the
way that seemed most reasonable to me but that I readily concede could
reasonably be resolved differently. For present purposes, I will not
attempt to explain my thinking in resolving each of those matters as I
did, but my resolution of two in particular seems to call for at least brief
explanation.
First, before settling on the single standard of review that is now
Step 2(b), I seriously considered whether the approach should instead
provide for enhancing the standard of review to something closer to
strict scrutiny if the challenger is able to prove a disproportionate racial
impact so substantial that it comes close to the type of impact produced
by a racial classification. Ultimately, however, I decided that asking
judges to determine more than whether the disproportionate racial
impact is “substantial” probably invites them to draw more distinctions
than they can draw with reasonable objectivity. 137
135. As should be apparent from my use of “law” throughout this Article, I use it here
broadly to refer to government action in any form.
136. I include the phrase, “in one or more respects,” to make clear that under my
approach a law may have a disproportionate racial impact even if the law in some way
harms racial minorities and nonminorities alike. The pool closings at issue in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), discussed in detail supra Part I, illustrate the point. The
pool closings deprived everyone in Jackson, Mississippi of the opportunity to swim in a
public pool, but as Justice White underlined in dissent, Jackson’s black population also
experienced a distinctive disadvantage. The pool closings were, in White’s words, “a
pronouncement that Negroes are somehow unfit to swim with whites,” and as an
expression of “the official view of Negro inferiority,” the closings “stigmatized” Jackson’s
black population alone. Id. at 268 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
137. Professor Perry has argued that the standard of review for a law having a
disproportionate racial impact needs to be “flexible” and that “the degree of disproportion
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Second, before deciding that the government should bear the burden
of proof on the issue of foreseeability in Step 2(a), I gave a fair amount
of thought to whether that burden should rest on the challenger
instead. Ultimately, however, I decided for two reasons that placing the
burden on the government is most reasonable. It is more in keeping
with the seriousness of the constitutional wrong—racial bias in
lawmaking—that the disproportionate racial impact indicates probably
occurred. In addition, it seems more appropriate in light of the
government’s typically greater access to relevant evidence on the
foreseeability issue.138
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH FOR
TODAY’S LEGAL BARRIERS TO VOTING
Near the end of his discussion rejecting the challengers’ equal
protection claim, Justice White wrote for the Court in Davis:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far-reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white.139

By “compelling justification,” I assume Justice White was referring to
the necessary-to-a-compelling-governmental-interest test that the Court
had been applying, and continues to apply, to laws explicitly treating
people differently on the basis of race. If that assumption is correct,
in the impact” is one of four “factors” a court should “weigh” in deciding constitutionality.
Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 540, 559–60 (1977). (The other three factors that he named are “the private
interest disadvantaged,” “the efficiency of the challenged law in achieving its objective
and the availability of alternative means having a less disproportionate impact,” and “the
government objective sought to be advanced.” Id. at 560.)
138. As discussed above, I believe that unfair stereotyping and an unfair legislative
process are not a concern when the lawmaker at the time of adopting a law truly did not
foresee a substantial disproportionate racial impact. Nonetheless, my approach requires
the government to prove that the lawmaker not only did not foresee such an impact but
also could not reasonably have foreseen it with due diligence. I include the second,
reasonableness prong in part as a check to help ensure that the lawmaker’s claimed
failure to foresee is real and not simply something that the government can bear its
burden of proving because of its advantage over the challenger in access to relevant
evidence. In addition, I include a reasonableness prong to avoid inviting willful ignorance
on the part of lawmakers.
139. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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then I readily concede that Justice White was right to warn that
adoption of the “rule” he described would have undesirable effects. It
indeed would “raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate,” a
host of laws. As discussed below, however, in terms of the challenge
before the Court in Davis, Justice White’s warning was beside the point.
For similar reasons, that warning has no more bearing on the viability
of the approach to disproportionate racial impact that I proposed in
Part IV.
The warning was irrelevant to the challenge before the Court in
Davis simply because it addressed the implications of applying a
standard of review that was not at issue in the case. In essence, Justice
White erected a straw man and then knocked it down. As noted in Part
I, the challengers were asking the Court to carry over to the
constitutional realm the standard of review that the Court several years
earlier in Griggs had applied to federal statutory claims of employment
discrimination. Though considerably more demanding than the
customary default standard in equal protection cases—the extremely
indulgent “rational basis” test—the standard of review sought by the
Davis challengers was considerably less demanding than the
“compelling justification” standard that Justice White invoked in
warning of “far-reaching” consequences.
For two reasons, Justice White’s warning is also irrelevant to my
proposed approach. Most obviously, my approach, like the one
advocated by the challengers in Davis, calls for a standard of review
significantly less demanding than the “compelling justification”
standard invoked by Justice White. In addition, unlike the approach
advocated by the Davis challengers, my approach affords the
government an unforeseeability defense that would enable it to avoid
some of the adverse consequences that would follow from application of
the strict scrutiny hypothesized by Justice White.
In short, there is no reason to see my approach as the sort of engine
of destruction described by Justice White. On the contrary, one would
anticipate that even if a challenger can prove that a law has a
substantial disproportionate racial impact, the government often will be
able to defend the law successfully by demonstrating either
unforeseeability under Step 2(a) or the law’s satisfaction of the Step
2(b) standard of review. Concededly, the Step 2(b) standard of review is
considerably more demanding than the rational basis test traditionally
applied. However, the rational basis test is so undemanding that asking
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the government to meet a significantly more demanding standard does
not mean setting the bar so high that law after law is doomed to fail. 140
That is not to say, however, that adopting my approach would not
have profound consequences in certain areas of law—in particular,
areas in which facially race-neutral legal constraints typically and, at
the time of adoption, foreseeably have a substantial disproportionate
racial impact and typically rest on little more than a rational basis. For
a prime example of one such area, look no further than the area of
voting rights. The legal impediments to voting that have become more
and more prevalent in recent years epitomize the kind of laws that
would be highly vulnerable to attack under my proposed approach.
The 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights discussed
earlier141 is very telling as to both the impact of, and justifications for,
contemporary legal barriers to voting. After 275 pages of heavily
footnoted discussion and analysis of minorities’ access to, and exercise
of, voting rights, the report has seven pages of findings. As the
unanimous findings of an independent, bipartisan federal agency, 142
those findings have a strong claim to objectivity and expertise, and they
paint a stark and powerful picture of a nation in which a wide variety of
facially race-neutral legal barriers to voting all too often have had a
substantial disproportionate racial impact that was foreseeable at the
time of adoption. Among the most pertinent findings are the following:

140. Consider, for example, the fate of sex classifications in the Supreme Court in the
years since the Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), settled on a middle-tier
standard of review between rational basis and strict scrutiny. According to the Court in
Craig, sex classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 197. To avoid any
intimation that I am trying to propose a middle-tier standard that places the bar
somewhat higher or lower than the Court’s, I described the requisite governmental
interest and means-end relationship in the same terms as the Court used in Craig.
Although I question whether the Court has been entirely consistent in its application of
the Craig standard of review, I suggest that it is quite possible to generalize about the
rigor with which that standard has been applied and that doing so offers a good sense of
the rigor with which I anticipate my proposed Step 2(b) would be applied. In particular,
compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating sex classifications), with Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 (2001), and Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding sex
classifications). For more on the middle-tier review used to decide the constitutionality of
sex classifications, see Simson, supra note 124.
141. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b) (2020) (Commission to consist of eight members, with no
more than four at any time of the same political party and with four to be appointed by
the president, two by the president pro tem of the Senate, and two by the speaker of the
House); id. § 1975(c) (members serve six-year terms); id. § 1975(e) (the president may only
remove a member “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office”).
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In states across the country, voting procedures that wrongly
prevent some citizens from voting have been enacted and have a
disparate impact on voters of color and poor citizens, including but
not limited to: voter ID laws, voter roll purges, proof of citizenship
measures, challenges to voter eligibility, and polling place moves or
closings.
Documentary proof of citizenship voter registration requirements
disparately prevent people of color from registering to vote.
Moreover, because these requirements force some citizens to pay fees
to replace lost proof-of-citizenship documents, documentary proof of
citizenship requirements impose a disparate cost on people of color.
As applied, “strict” voter ID laws that limit the acceptable forms of
proof of identity to a narrow list of documents correlate with an
increased turnout gap between white and minority citizens.
Voter roll purges often disproportionately affect African-American
or Latino-American voters.
Polling place changes can be used to impose barriers on minority
voters.
In some states, cuts to polling places resulted in decreased
minority voter access and influence.
When states cut early voting, they can create unduly long lines and
limit minority citizens’ access to voting. In some places where early
voting was reduced, minority citizens had disproportionately utilized
early voting.143

143. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 278, 282–83. For recent findings
along the same lines from a respected nongovernmental institute, see the following
excerpt from an analysis of the results of a poll conducted by the Public Religion Research
Institute and The Atlantic. The poll was conducted in June 2018 and asked people
primarily about their voting experiences in the November 2016 election:
The real extent of voter suppression in the United States is contested. As
was the case for poll taxes and literacy tests long ago, restrictive election laws
are often, on their face, racially neutral, giving them a sheen of legitimacy. But
the new data [from the poll] suggest that the outcomes of these laws are in no
way racially neutral. . . . They indicate that voter suppression is commonplace,
and that voting is routinely harder for people of color than for their white
counterparts.
The new data support perhaps the worst-case scenario offered by opponents
of restrictive voting laws. Nine percent of black respondents and 9 percent of
Hispanic respondents indicated that, in the last election, they (or someone in
their household) were told that they lacked the proper identification to vote.
Just 3 percent of whites said the same. Ten percent of black respondents and
11 percent of Hispanic respondents reported that they were incorrectly told
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The findings in the 2018 report include only one specifically
addressing the justifications offered for legal impediments to voting
that disproportionately disadvantage minorities. “Study after study,”
the finding states, “including from the Republican National Lawyers
Association and a News21 analysis, confirm that voter fraud is
extremely rare in the United States.” 144 Read in isolation, that finding
may appear to be of rather limited importance. It may seem to do no
more than cast doubt on the cogency of a justification—fraudavoidance—underlying a particular type of legal barrier to voting. Read
together, however, with the following paragraph, which begins the
section of the report entitled “Voter Fraud and Other Arguments,” the
finding assumes much greater importance. It becomes clear that the
finding drives a stake in the heart of the justification that, in one form
or another, is by far the primary justification offered for the array of
legal barriers to voting that disproportionately disadvantage racial
minorities:
The prominent argument championed by supporters of voter ID
laws and similar measures is that they prevent voter fraud. Voter
fraud includes allegations of: in-person voter fraud, noncitizen voting,
double voting, and voter registration rolls that are “bloated” and
contain ineligible voters who should be removed. Each of these
allegations arose during the Commission’s national briefing on
minority voting rights as reasons for strict voter ID laws and other
measures discussed in this chapter (these include: cuts to early
voting, requiring documentary proof of citizenship to register,
challenges to voter eligibility, and purges of voter registration
rolls). . . .145

If the justifications for the various legal voting barriers that
disproportionately disadvantage racial minorities are as flimsy as the
that they weren’t listed on voter rolls, as opposed to 5 percent of white
respondents. In all, across just about every issue identified as a common
barrier to voting, black and Hispanic respondents were twice as likely, or more,
to have experienced those barriers as white respondents.
....
These results add credence to what many critics of restrictive voting have
long suspected. First, voter-ID laws and other, similar statutes aren’t passed in
a vacuum, but rather in a country where people of color are significantly less
likely to be able to meet the new requirements. Whether intended to
discriminate or not, these laws discriminate in effect. . . .
Vann R. Newkirk, II, Voter Suppression Is Warping Democracy, THE ATLANTIC, July 17,
2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-suppression/
565355/.
144. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 282.
145. Id. at 102.
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2018 report maintains, a question naturally arises: Would those
barriers be able to survive judicial review even if the Court doesn’t
abandon its existing approach to disproportionate racial impact and
adopt one along the lines that I propose? After all, wouldn’t those
barriers fail even the rational basis test that every law at a minimum
must pass? In the abstract, it may seem that the answer to that
question can’t help but be “yes.” The Court’s case law on the application
of the rational basis test, however, leaves no real doubt that today’s
legal barriers to voting would survive rational basis review. Under that
case law, asking for a rational basis is asking for very, very little: A
rational basis exists as long as the justification is one that a reasonable
lawmaker plausibly or conceivably may hold. As the Court explained in
a classic statement of the rational basis test, “[T]he law need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it.”146
Are strict voter ID laws that disproportionately keep racial
minorities from voting rationally related to preventing voter fraud even
though “[s]tudy after study,” according to the 2018 report, “confirm that
voter fraud is extremely rare in the United States”? 147 Almost certainly
“yes.” Are such laws “substantially related,” as my proposed approach
requires, to that important government objective? Almost certainly
“no.”148
146. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). It is beyond the
scope of this Article to address the validity of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,
553 U.S. 181 (2008), and other decisions in which the Supreme Court has upheld voting
barriers in the face of a constitutional challenge based on the fundamentality of the right
to vote. For now, suffice it to say that I seriously question the majority’s determination in
Crawford, see id. at 202–03 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 209 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Alito,
JJ., concurring in the judgment), that the challengers had not made an adequate showing
of burden on the right to vote to warrant invalidating the photo identification law at
hand. In addition, and more basically, I seriously question whether the majority’s method
of analysis—one that predates Crawford, see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428
(1992)—gives equal protection principles and the fundamental right to vote recognized in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), their due. For a methodology
that I suggest fits far better with those principles, see Gary J. Simson, A Method for
Analyzing Discriminatory Effects under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV.
663, 678–81 (1977), and for the application of that methodology to Harper and a number
of other early voting rights cases decided by the Court, see id. at 682–90.
147. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 282.
148. I do not think it is overly optimistic to believe that judges can meaningfully draw
distinctions of this sort, but I recognize that some observers may be more skeptical. See,
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a
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VI. CONCLUSION
In closing, I would like to underline that, although I have framed my
proposed approach as addressed to the Supreme Court and as a logical
implication of doctrinal developments under the Equal Protection
Clause, I also regard the approach as entirely relevant to state courts’
interpretation of the equality provisions in their state constitutions. A
Supreme Court that in 2013 in Shelby County v. Holder149 dealt a major
blow to minority voting rights when it struck down the preclearance
formula in the Voting Rights Act may not be the ideal audience for an
approach like mine that holds the potential for expanding minority
rights in voting and other areas.150 I am hopeful, however, that in time,
if not in the near future, the Court will revise its approach to
disproportionate racial impact to bring it into sync with the Court’s
longtime treatment of racial classifications as suspect. Until then, those
challenging the constitutionality of laws having disproportionate racial
impacts would do well to tap into the readiness of many state courts to
exercise leadership in constitutional interpretation by the thoughtful
development of state constitutional law. 151

Post-Truth World, ST. LOUIS U.L.J. (forthcoming 2020), https://www.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418427 (revised draft of Nov. 7, 2019). According to Professor
Hasen:
The Justices live in the real, and polarized, contemporary United States. It
is worth a pause to note that one of the Justices’ spouses frequently touts
unsupported voter fraud claims on social media and considered actions at
polling places aimed at stopping purported non-citizen voter fraud. This
certainly must affect this Justice’s world views of the facts at issue.
....
Facts should matter to these Justices, as facts always should matter when
courts decide cases of social and political importance. But in an increasingly
post-fact society, where political tribalism rules and is amplified by social
media, and Justices are the product of the world around them, what hope do
we have for reasoned deliberation and rational decisionmaking? Very little, as
the already frayed line between law and politics stands ready to collapse.
Id. at 32–33 (footnote omitted citing an article discussing Justice Thomas’s wife’s
“anti-fraud campaign”).
149. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
150. There have been two changes in the Court’s composition since Shelby County:
Justice Scalia died and was replaced by Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kennedy retired and
was replaced by Justice Kavanaugh. In my view, those changes do not suggest that
today’s Court is apt to be any more protective than the Shelby County Court of minority
voting rights. Instead, if anything, they suggest that it is apt to be less protective.
151. For brief discussion of both the opportunity in general presented to litigants by
state constitutional law and one successful effort to spur the development of state
constitutional law, see Gary J. Simson, Reflections on Free Exercise: Revisiting Rourke v.
Department of Correctional Services, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1425 (2007).
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